Most fiscal incidence studies neither analyze simultaneously the tax and benefit incidence (simply known as net fiscal incidence) nor actually relate poverty indices to fiscal impact. This paper jointly and separately examines the redistributive and poverty effects of the tax and transfer (education and health) systems in Cameroon. Broadly speaking, the tax system is generally progressive but less so when compared with the benefits of education and health. The net tax system is found to reduce inequality. Interestingly, while overall public spending on education and health are most progressive in rural areas, followed by semi-urban and urban areas, the opposite is true for tax incidence. Tax burden weighs more on the urban, followed by the rural and semi-urban, population. When we consider the two sets of policies together, they are found to mainly reflect fiscal policies in that they are more progressive and poverty-reducing when we use relative poverty lines in rural areas, followed by semi-urban and urban areas, respectively. Though we also realized a poverty-increasing effect of the net tax system using absolute poverty lines, the poverty impact still remains minimal in the rural areas where poverty is high and inequality actually increased between 1996 and 2001 than in urban areas.
Introduction
Cameroon and other African countries have achieved remarkable gains in living standards as reflected in social indicators and income since gaining independence. In the case of Cameroon's economy, the nominal GDP grew at an average rate of 18.2 percent, rising from 300.4 billion CFAF in 1970 to 4135.1 billion CFAF in 1986. From 1987 onwards however, the country was hit by a severe economic crisis that resulted in a sharp decline in per capita income. This economic decline took its toll on the social sectors as manifested by consumption inequalities and structural poverty in the 1990s.
Recently, poverty alleviation has received much attention in Cameroon especially at a time when the government is still finalizing its poverty reduction strategy program (PRSP), a key requirement to qualifying for admission into the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of the Work Bank. This is an important innovation in the post -1999 approach to poverty alleviation that involves preparation of the PRSPs by recipient countries as a prerequisite for debt reduction and for access to concessionary loans and grants.
Several measures have already been defined and are currently being undertaken to fight poverty, such as diversifying and reinforcing ongoing actions in priority sectors such as education, health and infrastructure, and crafting policies that increase the purchasing power of the population. In spite of these, policy makers and bureaucrats still face the problem of making and executing policies that effectively target the poor groups. The answers to questions such as who benefits from public spending in education and health and who finances most of these spending are indispensable inputs to effective policies and pro-poor programs. This is important especially given the economic upturn marking the period from 1995 to 2001 that is expected to trigger off changes in the environment within which families make decisions about children's schooling and health care.
Furthermore, with the goal of HIPC recognition, providing policy makers with useful information would be helpful once HIPC is finally granted since it rationalizes poverty alleviation efforts. Thus, a key priority for policy makers is to have an insight into how best domestic budget revenue should be mobilized in ways that minimize the tax burden on the poor, and maximize equity among income groups.
Tabi (2003) states that the indirect tax system could be a useful tool to promote equity in Cameroon, Secondly, a study on benefit incidence in the health sector exists in Cameroon (Kamgnia 2003) yet there is no review of the distributive impact of spending on education nor the direct tax system (which are other vital inputs for poverty alleviation). This study attempts to separately and jointly examine the distributional effects of the entire tax system, and particularly its transfers through the educational and health systems in Cameroon. Examining the joint effect of tax and transfer is important because, despite the fact that the federal personal income tax structure of most developing countries (Cameroon included) is progressive, when other taxes are taken into account, the overall impact of the tax system is thought to be nearly proportional. If this view holds for Cameroon, then wealthy households may actually be paying relatively less yet are benefiting more from the fiscal system and transfer programs than do the poor.
This study is therefore important in its effort to examine the net effects of fiscal incidence. In addition to the distributional effect, this study further examines the poverty impact of fiscal policy in Cameroon. However, we are aware of the fact that our component of public spending is limited to the health and education sectors. Numerous simplifying assumptions are also made and diverse data sources in the area of tax incidence are used.
Hopefully, we are able to give a fair picture of separate and combined fiscal incidence of Cameroon. Specifically, the study has examined the following: a) the progressiveness of direct and indirect taxes and social spending on health and education; b) the extent to which taxes and social spending constitute targeted means for poverty reduction; c) the overall and separate redistributive and poverty impacts of the tax and transfer (education and health) systems. d) the impact of reforms on the tax and transfer system (via simulations); e) the possible policy measures for poverty alleviation.
Income poverty profile in Cameroon
Cameroon's welfare indicators have been moving closely towards increased incomes and economic growth. For over three decades since its independence in 1960, the per capita income in the country was at its highest level in 1984/85 and was at its lowest at 249,000
CFA francs in 1986 with the onset of the economic crisis and worsening fiscal situation.
However, the situation seemed to have improved between 1996 and 2001. In all, the per capita income estimated through per adult equivalent expenditure witnessed an increase of 14.8 percent in five years beginning 1996, or an annual increase of 3 percent. Economic growth remained fragile since it could only support part of the increase in per capita spending. Generally speaking, households benefited from the economic growth during the period 1996-2001. During this same period, urban households witnessed an annual increase in their average per adult equivalent spending of 4.1 percent as compared to 1.7 percent for rural households. Despite the relatively promising figures, economic growth has clearly not been equally distributed across the entire population (DSCN 2002 ).
Cameroon's poverty study as indicated by DSCN (1997 DSCN ( , 2002 based on the 1996 and 2001 household surveys reveals that poverty affected an estimated 53.3 percent and 40.2 percent of Cameroonians respectively. The modification of the incidence of poverty, intensity of poverty and severity of poverty can be used to better appreciate the evolution of the monetary aspects of poverty. As observed in table 1 below, the overall incidence of poverty fell by about 13.1percent while its depth was reduced only by 5 percent, with the greatest reduction occurring in the urban area. The general amelioration of the poverty situation by 13.1 points is more manifested in urban areas than in rural areas, that is, 19.3 points as against 9.7 respectively. The intensity of poverty that shows the gap between the average income of the poor and the poverty line witnessed a drop from 19.1 percent to 14.1 percent. In general, the monetary deficit of the poor was reduced by 26.2 percent in five years, with the reduction being more significantly felt in urban areas. Within the poor, the poverty phenomenon was less severe in 2001 than in 1996 due to the reduction of the inequality between the poor.
The incomes of the poor were less dispersed with respect to the poverty line in 2001 than in 1996. Severity or gravity of poverty P 2 was 9 percent in 1996 as compared to 7.0 percent in 2001. Again, the reduction of the gap between the poor was most felt in urban than in rural areas.
Inequality in income distribution remained high and even rose slightly between 1996 and 2001. There were more income disparities between individuals in 2001 than in 1996.
This situation was confirmed by the Gini index: in 1996 the overall index was 0.406 while it was 0.408 in 2001. Thus, inequality persisted and its severity was even more felt the rural areas and the male population (see Table 2 below). Therefore, despite several measures undertaken in accordance with the structural adjustment program initiated in the 1987/88
Budget, it was clear that more effort had to be exerted to further reduce poverty and inequality especially in the rural areas. 
The national budget and fiscal adjustments in Cameroon
The budget, specifically its taxation and public spending aspects, is a vital instrument in the provision of public goods and services and the alleviation of poverty. In Cameroon, from the 1960s to 1986, the government was able to meet its revenue needs while simultaneously providing social services to the population. However, with the onset of the economic crisis in the mid-80s, severe budgetary cuts were enforced that affected the allocation of total expenditure for the different sectors. Between the mid-80s and the early 90s, the social sectors of education and health gradually witnessed an increase in their shares of expenditure in the total budget with education reaching a peak of 17% in 1991 but declined seriously in 1992. The health sector maintained a constant share of 4 percent whereas the other components such as spending on agriculture, road infrastructure, communication, etc witnessed negative growth. Over the same period, total tax revenue gradually increased to average 80 percent as a share of total revenue up until 1986, then declined sharply to finally average 60 percent (Amin, 1998).
The main types of taxes that account for the bulk of tax receipts are taxes on income and profits, and indirect taxes such as taxes on goods, services and international trade. With respect to revenue contribution, taxes from trade constitute the most important source of tax revenue topped by import duties. While export tax ranged from 5 percent in the late 1960s to 0.3 percent in the early 1990s, import taxes were as high as 30 percent in the early 1960s
and as low as 1.5 percent in the early 1990s (Amin, 1998 
An overview of fiscal incidence studies
In economics, there is continuing interest in measuring the distributional impact of the public sector's budget. This concerns studies on tax and benefit incidence that both compute and allocate tax burdens to different income groups or impute subsidies to individuals or households identified as users of a public service. Most tax incidence studies compute tax burden on the basis of annual data for income sources and expenditure patterns. Tax burden is also computed on the basis of several assumptions concerning how the different taxes are shifted to households either because they are consumers (for indirect taxes) or owners of factors of production for direct taxes.
Others have used the input-output table (Rajemison and Younger, 2000) to take into account the nature of production in the economy in order to understand the incidence of consumption taxes, while some use the computable general equilibrium model pioneered by Harberger (1962) with the consequent increase in complexity and cost. For the latter, tax incidence is established by comparing the vector of equilibrium prices before and after the tax change. This may be done in the context of 'differential' tax incidence where one tax is substituted for another while keeping government expenditures constant, or in the context of 'absolute' tax incidence where a tax is introduced holding government expenditures 8 constant. In these cases, the additional revenue collected by the government may be rebated to taxpayers in a lump sum fashion.
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On the other hand, two broad approaches have been widely used in the estimation of public expenditure incidence 3 . The first, based on the Aaron and McGuire (1970) methodology, emphasizes the individual's own valuation of the good (i.e., the demand, or virtual price). However, there are difficulties inherent in estimating these valuations (as reviewed by Cornes, 1995) and this has called for less demanding approaches in which publicly-provided goods and services are valued at their marginal cost (Brennan, 1976) . This second approach is called benefit incidence analysis. It combines the cost of providing public services with information on their use to show how the benefits of government spending are distributed across the population.
However, in all the existing studies reviewed henceforth, only a few have analyzed net fiscal incidence or even related poverty indices to fiscal impact. This development is considered in this study. Net fiscal incidence is the difference between the benefits an individual receives from consuming government goods and services and the loss in consumption arising from bearing a certain tax burden. In other words, net fiscal incidence is the appropriate measure of the distributional impact of a government's tax and expenditure policy. The only study on net fiscal incidence in a developing country is by Deverajan and Hossain (1998) on the Philippines. They use a multi-sector, computable general equilibrium model to estimate the incidence of taxes and benefit incidence to determine the redistribution of spending on education, health and infrastructure. This study first uses progressivity measures in addition to comparing the share of each income docile with its share of taxes net of transfer. This is useful in indicating the degree of progressivity for comparison over time and space. Secondly, we initiate a measure for the fiscal-poverty link.
However, the data demanding nature of net fiscal incidence analysis could explain why the literature on the subject remains scarce. Despite the non-availability of income data in our survey, we make use of the household income generated by the National Statistics Office to compute household income tax.
Tax Incidence
Tax incidence is the analysis of who ultimately bears the burden of government taxes in the economy. There is a considerable list of studies in the literature of tax incidence analyses with empirical estimates extending as far back as over half a century. In this paper,
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we present a review of the incidence results obtained in some recent studies and provide a summary of the general trends based on their findings .
Three recent country studies that describe the extent to which the tax system succeeds in transferring resources to the poor in African countries are: Uganda (Chen et al., 2001 ), Madagascar , Ghana (Younger 1996) . Sahn and Younger (1998) carried out some analysis in seven African countries; South Africa, Tanzania, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, and the three other countries previously mentioned. In a more recent case in Cameroon, preliminary results were quite similar (Tabi Atemnkeng, 2004) to those above.
The tax system of the countries is found to be progressive or mildly progressive except for taxes on kerosene and export duties, which are regressive. However, in Cameroon the progressivity of consumption taxes that was the focus of the study was reinforced following the tax and custom reforms in 1994.
Other studies on tax incidence recently undertaken in Latin America also produce the same overall conclusion of progressivity or mild progressivity of the tax systems, as in the case of Guatemala (Bahl et al., 1996) and Mexico (Martinez-Vazquez, 2001 ). Several others reviewed in Shah and Whaley (1991) also find a broadly progressive overall incidence pattern, with the exception of Wasylenko (1986) who found an inverted U-shape incidence pattern where income is redistributed from the middle income groups to the poor and the rich in Jamaica.
In developed countries especially between the 1950s and 1980s, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) review results of similar studies with the incidence of taxation being roughly proportional over a wide range of incomes. In OECD countries, Messere (1997) recently finds generally proportional or mildly progressive patterns where governments have always taken steps to main proportionality or mild progressivity of the entire tax system. However, as reported in Bird and De Wulf (1973) , the findings on overall progressive tax incidence over the last two decades contrast with those found in earlier studies. Of the 24 tax incidence studies for Latin America that these authors reviewed, only four were to have found some degree of progressivity in their tax systems. Thus, it may be that the move toward progressivity in more recent times has been due to changes in tax policies or reforms (Tabi Atemnkeng, 2003) .
Expenditure Incidence
A number of studies have employed the unit cost approach to determine the benefit of either education or health spending (see for example, Selden and Wasylenko 1992; Meerman 1979; Selowsky 1979; Demery, Dayton and Mehra, 1996, Castro-Leal et al., 2000; Demery 2000 , Chu et al., 2000 . However, others use the behavioral approach to study the benefit of education (Gertler and Glewwe, 1990 ) whereas Younger (1999) uses a combination of benefit and behavioral approaches to examine the incidence impact of education and health expenditures.
From this brief review of the empirical literature on the incidence of public expenditures in developing countries, Martinez-Vazquez (2001) and Chu et al., (2000) note some identical patterns. Incidence studies of public expenditures only cover a share of total government expenditures mostly focusing on education, health and basic utilities. In the majority of cases, overall public spending in each of the areas of education, health and transfer payments was found to be progressive, but it was often poorly targeted, especially for countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Health spending was found to be progressive in all cases, but well targeted in only half of the cases. Targeting was poorest in transition countries and sub-Saharan Africa. The latter fact was consistent with the findings reported by Castro-Leal et al. (2000), which considered several African countries. Nevertheless, most of these studies do not distinguish levels of health care. It may be that targeting is reasonably good for basic health care, but poorer for higher level health care facilities.
However, a study in Ghana in 1991-92 somewhat surprisingly found that spending on health centers and clinics is not any better targeted toward the poor than spending on hospitals (Demery et al. 1996) .
Data and methodology

Nature of Data
This study is based on data from Cameroon's Household Survey ( education, leisure spectacles and cultures. Under these headings were sub-items or commodities. The ECAM 2 or 2001 survey does not contain complete information on income sources needed for direct tax incidence analysis. Household income tax generated by the National Statistics Office was used to determine tax incidence. Nevertheless, taxes on non-agricultural family enterprises reported in the survey enabled us to examine the incidence of family business tax.
In examining the welfare impact of fiscal policy, we used household expenditures (per capita or per equivalent adult) as a proxy for permanent income. The reason for this is that households tend to report their expenditures more accurately than they report their incomes.
They are more inclined to hide incomes than expenditure (from the enumerator and from family members). Likewise, it enables us to easily compare the progressivity of taxes and public expenditures using a common money-metric of utility, and when also used as a welfare indicator, households could thus be ranked and the inequality level measured. The benefits of public spending are valued using the monetary welfare metric method and various indirect taxes have been computed following the tax laws and system in the country.
Techniques and Analysis of Net Fiscal Incidence
In this analysis, tax incidence captures the effects of both direct and indirect taxes.
Direct taxes include income and family business taxes, while indirect taxes consider import tariffs, value added taxes (VAT), and excises. On the other hand benefit incidence focus on spending on education and health that constitute the transfer system. Public expenditures generate transfer to the population, which in our case includes subsidized public schools and hospitals. After estimating tax payments and benefits for use of public services 4 , the next step is to check the progressivity against two benchmarks: whether they are progressive,
i.e., inequality reducing relative to our welfare benchmark (the Gini coefficient of the expenditure distribution or the Lorenz curve). This is to assure that tax (benefits) are per capita progressive, implying that those at the lower (upper) end of the income distribution pay (receive) at least an equal level of taxes (benefits) as upper (lower) income individuals.
One of the most widely used methods in doing so is known as 'welfare dominance'.
The methodology, developed by Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) The Lorenz curve is the most popular graphical tool for illustrating and comparing income inequality. It provides complete information on the whole distribution of income relative to the mean, and thereby gives a more comprehensive description of the standard of living than any one of the traditional summary statistics of dispersion. The Lorenz curve at p -percentile of the population is:
The numerator Apart from using concentration curves, other techniques of distributive analysis involve the use of inequality indices and non-parametric regressions.
As for the Lorenz curves and S-Gini indices of inequality to be used, the concentration indices are determined by aggregating the distance between p and the concentration curves C(p). These indices of concentration are useful to compute aggregate indices of progressivity and vertical equity such as the Kakwani and Reynolds-Smolensky defined below. Thus, the distance p-C(p) can simply be weighted by an ethical weight κ(p) (Duclos and Araar, 2004) of which the popular form is given by κ(p;ρ). This gives the following class of S-Gini indices of concentration, IC(ρ):
In addition to these indices, we have also provided some descriptive statistics on tax contributions and program benefits according to income deciles that give another picture of 13 redistribution that may not be provided by progressivity analysis (see Tables B-2b, B-2c, B- 4b and B-5b).
From the above definitions, we now determine whether the actual tax and transfer system is really progressive and inequality-reducing. Two leading approaches exist for this exercise. The first is the Tax-Redistribution (TR) approach, while the second is the IncomeRedistribution (IR) approach. Globally, TR involves comparing the Lorenz curve for per capita expenditures, L X (p) and the concentration curves for taxes and or benefits. The IR approach considers the difference between the concentration curves of net income and the Lorenz curve (Duclos and Araar, 2004) .
Expenditure (tax) is progressive if it benefits (taxes) poorer households more (less) than wealthy ones, relative to their income, and regressive if it does not. Following the tax redistribution approach (Duclos and Araar, 2004) , a tax T is said to be TR-progressive if its concentration curve, C T (p) lies anywhere below the Lorenz curve, L X (p). Of the two taxation schemes, the more TR-progressive one is that whose concentration curve is the lowest (see Figure 1 ). On the other hand, a benefit B is TR-progressive if its concentration curve, C B (p) lies anywhere above the Lorenz curve, L X (p) 6 . Of the two benefits, the more TR-progressive one is that whose concentration curve is the highest and lying above the Lorenz curve for expenditure 
for p ]0,1]. This point is illustrated in figure 5a. However, the conditions for welfare dominance are satisfied only when concentration curves do not intersect.
The dominance test may often be inconclusive in terms of providing information on the relative progressivity of different types of public expenditure (taxes) because of the requirement that each of the concentration curves for public expenditure (taxes) must be above (below) the other everywhere along the income distribution. In this case, we make use of a second approach to draw conclusions about welfare evaluation and incidence analysisthe cardinal measure of welfare. We summarize progressivity as well as the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers into inequality indices. Though several options of inequality indexes exist and can be used, the most common is the Gini coefficient. Yitzhaki (1983) for example provides a framework for analysing welfare dominance by using extended Gini coefficients. These allow for adjustments in the social weights given to various households, and provide a clearer notion of how alternative social welfare functions differ with expenditure or tax regimes.
With the DAD software, one can easily compute progressivity indices as differences between S-Gini indices of inequality, G X (ρ) and concentration, IC T/B (ρ) for the tax and/or transfer system respectively. With ρ=2, the indices correspond to the traditional Gini as earlier mentioned. Kakwani (1977) provides a progressivity measure defined in terms of the elasticity of the tax function T(X) with respect to income X. Using the Lorenz, L X (p) and concentration, C T/B (p) curves, a proportional tax or transfer will mean a merging of the two curves while progressivity is measured by the distance between them. The Kakwani indices for the tax and transfer are given as:
The expressions in equation (5.4) coincide with the TR approach and the Kakwani index will be positive if both the tax and benefit are progressive (see Tables B-4a and B-5a).
However, considering that T * =T-B is tax net of transfers, then the progressiveness of the net tax when this tax is perceived as the final tax that the household pays (being positive when T>B) is determined using the IR-progressivity approach. The net tax is IR-progressive if the concentration curve of net final income, C X-T * (p) lies above L X (p). Finally, the net tax is more IR-progressive than a tax, T (and/or transfer, B) if C X-T * exceeds C X-T (p) and C X+B (p) but all curves lying above Lx (p) (see Figure 7b ).
The redistributive impact of the combined tax and transfer system may be judged by the degree to which it reduces the Gini measure of inequality when moving from pre-tax and/or pre-transfer to post-tax/transfer total household expenditure. In the case of the distribution of pre-tax/transfer expenditure, X, the Gini measure, Gx, is expressed in terms of the following covariance
where F(x) is the distribution function of household expenditure, so that F(x) represents the proportion of individuals with expenditure less than or equal to x, and x is the arithmetic mean of pre-tax /transfer expenditure. Suppose that net or post-tax/transfer expenditure, n is given by
where T * (x) is tax net of transfer or net tax for short 8 . The redistributive effect of the combined tax and transfer system is the difference between the two Gini measures, L, so that:
This is referred to as the Reynolds-Smolensky measure of income redistribution progressivity. A (positive) negative value of L indicates that the combined tax and transfer system is inequality (increasing) reducing (see Table B -2a) 9 .
We compare also the progressivity of the education and health subsidies as well as the overall subsidy and taxes respectively. For the former, health is more TR-progressive than education if its concentration curve is above that of education (see Figure 4) . Using Income-redistribution (IR) approach, aggregate benefit, B (i.e. education plus health subsidies), is more IR-progressive than aggregate indirect taxes if the concentration curve of post-transfer income, C X+B (p) lies above that of post-tax income, C X-T (p) (see Figure 5a for the IR-and Figure 5b for the TR-approaches respectively ).
Another objective of this paper is to make simulations on the impact of reforms on the tax and transfer system. This involves an estimation of the expected relationship between variables representing the second most important sphere of recent applications of kernel estimation techniques (Duclos and Araar 2004) . In this case, we estimate the relationship between the average and marginal rates of taxation and transfer on gross income. We expect a part of tax to be a function of the value of gross income X, otherwise taxes would be lump sum and orthogonal to gross income. Thus, one can think of a tax T or a benefit, B as being a stochastic function of X, with
where u and w are stochastic determinants. Non-parametric regressions like these enable one to predict expected levels of taxes and benefits or their ratios at various gross income levels. Denoting the average rate of taxation or benefit at gross income X by t(X) or t(B), then t(X) = T(X)/X and t(B) =B(X)/X. A tax (transfer) is progressive if the average rate of taxation (benefit) increases (decreases) with income (see Figure 6 ). This result should also coincide with the marginal taxation/benefit rates (see Figure 7a) . Thus, we estimate the marginal taxation/benefit rates for final tax rates. For instance, recalling that T * and X are tax net of transfers and income or expenditure respectively, then 8 Letting X and N be gross and net incomes respectively, with T as taxes and B as transfers, then net tax is T * =T-B. Gross income is pre-tax and /or pre-transfer income, and net income is post-tax/transfer income. From sample data, algebraically N= total expenditure (X) -T * or X-T+B. 9 We also compute the redistributive effect of the direct and indirect tax systems respectively with net income given as N1 =X-T and for the benefit system for N2=X+B separately.
for the combined tax and transfer system, the marginal taxation rate is given as dT * /dX. A net tax (possibly including a transfer or subsidy) is said to be progressive if dT * /dX increases with X. This is the case with the marginal tax/benefit rate (see Figure 7) . Such simulation exercises are also made using the conditional standard deviation of taxes and benefits (see Figure 8 ).
Lastly, this study also intends to introduce the direct link between poverty indices and fiscal impact. We assess poverty using adult equivalent pre-and post-tax/transfer incomes (expenditures) to get a clear image of the welfare impact of fiscal mechanisms. This analysis is done for the net income given as N1=X-T or N2=X+B for the tax and transfer systems respectively and with the final net income of N=X-T+B for the combined tax and benefit system. In all cases, fiscal intervention at the level of taxes, education plus health or the entire effect will (reduce) increase poverty if the FGT indexes 10 (decrease) increase following the transition from pre-tax/transfer to post tax/transfer expenditures (see Table B -3). We avoided a source of bias considering the fact that the value attributed by the poor to education and health services may be below the cost of producing the services by using a relative poverty line in addition to an absolute poverty line. Relative poverty lines can be useful in determining the commodities needed for 'living without shame' and for participating in the 'prevailing consumption level'. A relative poverty line is typically set as an arbitrary proportion of the mean or some quantile (often the median) of living standards. Clearly, such a poverty line will vary with the central tendency of the distribution of living standards, and will not be the same across regions and over time.
One awkward feature of the relative poverty line approach is that a policy which raises the living standards of all, but proportionately more those of the rich, will increase poverty, although the absolute living standards of the poor have risen. Conversely, a natural catastrophe which hurts absolutely everyone will decrease poverty if the rich are proportionately the most hurt
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. Another awkward feature of using relative poverty lines is that an improvement in the absolute living standards of some of the poor, with no change in 10 The class of poverty indices takes the form:
where yi is adult equivalent consumption expenditures for those individuals below the poverty line, and zero for those above, Z is the poverty line, n* the total population, and q the number of poor people. The parameter α, takes the value of zero for the headcount index (P0), 1 for the poverty gap (P1) and 2 for the squared poverty gap (P2). We used an annual expenditure per adult equivalent of 232547 FCFA determined by DSCN (2002) as the poverty line. 11 The results on Table B-3b clearly indicate these facts as transfer on education and health increase poverty while a tax which affects the rich most reduces poverty. Transfers are also generally progressive or inequality reducing but it appears the rise in income of poorest is more important than that of the less-so-poor. As such poverty still rises though inequality declines. the living standards of the others, may in fact increase poverty. However, it provides a way to keep the poverty line up to date with overall economic changes in a society. It is also easy to understand, easy to calculate and easy to update. The absolute method sets the poverty line as a minimum amount of resources at a point in time and updates the line only for price changes overt time. As mentioned above, one weakness of using an absolute poverty line is that the value attributed to a service may be below the cost of producing that service. As a result the impact of public spending on poverty is exaggerated 12 . However, like in benefit incidence the associated decline in poverty and even inequality or its reverse are immediate consequences that do not take into account related long-term benefits and externalities. These could occur in the form of life-long enhanced labor productivity or possible employment opportunities generated from spending on education and health, which are variants of human capital.
Results
The fiscal system has now become one of the few and most important instruments available to the government of a poor country in fighting poverty. This concerns taxation and public spending on social services such as education and health (see fiscal incidence studies as reviewed in the literature) Like indirect taxation, which ranks over direct taxes, the relative share of government spending on education and health is significant (about 30 percent of total spending of the Central government in 2001). It is therefore essential to determine whether the poor pay much of the taxes or how well targeted the social services are towards the poor and how far they can go in alleviating their plight. In this section, we present the results of the separate and combined incidence of tax and expenditure computed with the aid of DAD software for distributive analysis developed by researchers in CREFA, Université Laval
13
. We incorporate policy instruments as concerns the tax and benefit system by linking each and both of the systems to poverty and inequality measures.
Tax incidence
In this section, we present the impact of the taxation side of the budget on inequality and poverty. As cited earlier, the survey does not contain information on income sources.
The computation of a lump sum household personal income tax (e.g. on wages and salary and others) had been determined with the aid of an input-output table by the National Statistics Office, while tax on non-agricultural family enterprises is reported in the survey.
Using the Kakwani measure, personal income taxes can be said to be generally progressive in Cameroon. However, while the lump sum household income tax is slightly progressive, tax from family businesses is more progressive (see Table B -4a). The reason for the slight progressivity of the former could be linked to the old system. Until January 2004, the taxation of personal incomes in Cameroon included a proportional tax rate and a graduated surtax imposed on taxpayer's annual net income, consisting of about 11 income brackets and progressively rated from 0 to 60 percent. Further analysis using descriptive statistics on the distribution of tax burden (Table B-4b) indicates some degree of proportionality for personal income and family business taxes. These are reasons to believe that family business tax is underreported for some income brackets while household expenditure could have also been underreported for lower income brackets in the case of personal income tax.
The new personal income tax is now comprised solely of a unique progressive tax, and one of the reasons for instituting fiscal reforms is government's aim of rendering these taxes more progressive 14 . Figure 1b) , to some extent the current study provides optimistic results suggesting strong and progressive indirect taxation. Most indirect taxes in Cameroon, including broad-based taxes such as VAT, commodity specific excises and import duties, are progressive.
For indirect tax incidence (based on Table B-4 that provides the Kakawani indices and descriptive statistics on distribution of tax burdens on various kinds of indirect taxes including concentration curves presented in
Other individual taxes such as taxes on the direct consumption of gasoline, special tax on petroleum products (TSSP) and excises are more progressive than import taxes and the VAT. Furthermore, since most gasoline is consumed as an intermediate input to other services, most especially transport, this indirect effect is captured by assuming that fuel accounts for about 18.5 percent of the cost of intercity and intracity transport (i.e. the survey data includes average input-output coefficient for petroleum in the transport sector for three years). By assuming that part of the gasoline tax falls on users of public transport, progressivity measures for this tax as well as for the combined impact of direct purchase of gasoline and the indirect purchase through public transport were also computed. The results indicate that even the tax on public transport is progressive, though not as progressive as the direct consumption of gasoline. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these services are concentrated among urban households.
The foregoing analysis contradicts the view that higher gasoline taxation -an unpopular yet increasingly common instrument being resorted to for raising revenues in African countries -is regressive. Comparing various indirect taxes, while the VAT dominates import taxation, excises and taxes on gasoline and diesel consumption are highly progressive especially with the introduction of a special tax on petroleum products. The latter are judged preferable on efficiency grounds because of the negative externalities associated with them. On the contrary, tobacco excise is regressive in Cameroon as found in other studies e.g. Sahn and Younger (1998) and Tabi Atemnkeng (2003) . Thus, our results indicate that both the direct and indirect tax structures are mildly progressive. We also use expenditure per adult equivalent to rank households with results (not reported) indicating an improvement in progressivity.
Lastly, regarding the taxation system it was found that direct taxes (indirect taxes) generate for households an increase (a reduction) in inequality when moving from the distribution of expenditure net of taxes (see Table B -2a) . The increase in inequality is minimal when using expenditure per equivalent adult (results not reported) 15 . However, the entire system reduces inequality mostly in the semi-urban regions followed by the rural and urban areas respectively. This result conforms to the descriptive statistics presented in table B-2b where tax burden weighs more on the urban population, followed by the rural and semiurban population, respectively. Furthermore, the taxation structure causes a rise in poverty mostly in the urban areas followed by the semi-urban and rural areas when absolute poverty lines are used (see Table B -3a) . However, using relative poverty lines results in a fall in poverty with the rural areas benefiting most (Table B-3b). Whatever poverty line used, it is the rural population that benefits most.
Benefit from social spending
The concentration curves for social sector benefits (Figures 2 to 4) can be helpful in showing how targeted and progressive subsidies are. However, where a curve crosses the Lorenz curve for expenditure, it is often difficult to judge its progressivity. The Kakwani indices are presented in table B-5a. A positive Kakwani index reveals that the subsidy is more pro-poor. Concentration curves lying above the expenditure line indicate that the 20 subsidy is more equally distributed than income or expenditure. As a proportion of total expenditure, poorer groups or lower deciles gain more than the better off (see Table B -5b).
By comparing the concentration curves with the 45° diagonal, targeting to poorer groups can be judged. Thus, if the curve lies above the diagonal, it means for example that the poorest deciles gain more than 10 percent of the total subsidy and the richest deciles, less than 10 percent. Such social services are said to be per capita progressive.
In Cameroon, the analyses indicate that primary education and some components of primary health facilities are well targeted and per capita progressive. Whereas secondary and tertiary education are poorly targeted, being below the diagonal, it is however difficult to judge the progressivity for tertiary education as it crosses the Lorenz curve. Nevertheless the Kakwani indices as well as the deciles' share of benefits indicate that secondary schooling is more progressive than tertiary education, which is regressive. Thus, at higher levels of education, progressivity declines.
Lastly hospital care is poorly targeted as its curve lies between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve. On the whole, public health services are relatively evenly distributed than public education spending (see Figure 4) . The results on public health services are similar to those of Kamgnia (2003) , where she concludes that as expected, the benefit from public spending in Cameroon is per capita progressive. She further noted that, although reference hospitals 16 receive the highest budget average share, the large number of peripheral health centers is such that the category gets the largest budget allocation. Consequently their common use by poor individuals leads to an equal distribution of the net transfer (Kamgnia 2003) . Therefore, public health care is globally progressive in Cameroon, as found in other African countries by Castro-Leal et al (1999) .
The distribution of social services over the milieu residence does not provide a balanced pattern. Though overall, benefits are progressive (Table B-5a) they are more progressive in rural areas (Table B-2b). As observed from the indices in table B-5a, in terms of progressivity, total spending on education is more progressive in the urban areas, followed by rural areas and lastly semi-urban areas. A surprising result is the case of tertiary education, where the rural population benefits relatively more from this subsidy. However, parents in the urban areas send absolutely more children to the university than their counterparts living in the rural areas. Equally in the case of public health, there is a slight regional balance in terms of progressivity. However, hospital care appears more progressive in the urban regions since they are based in the cities, followed by the semi-urban and later by the rural areas respectively. Regionally, spending is unevenly distributed geographically with rural areas benefiting most followed by semi-urban areas. However, in the case of higher education which is not found in all the urban areas or towns, its progressivity may depend on other factors e.g. the desire to have their children obtain higher education. The result sheds light on the fact that standard benefit incidence is incomplete as it does not consider policy variables in estimating the value of a service and so leaves out factors that could determine the use of a service.
Finally, the overall benefit system generates a small decrease in inequality (Table B- 2a) as well as a remarkable fall (rise) in poverty for households when an absolute poverty line (relative poverty line) is used (Tables B-3 ). Rural households mostly benefit from these redistributive and poverty effects followed by semi-urban and urban households respectively.
The results support the view that improved health and education facilities are an effective means to reduce rural poverty.
Net fiscal incidence
This section provides the results of the combined tax and expenditure incidence. The positive poverty effect of the combined tax and transfer system is minimal in rural areas.
Though the net tax contributes positively (Table B-3a) or negatively (Table B-3b) to poverty, the rural regions mostly benefit, followed by the semi-urban and the urban areas, respectively in terms of the magnitude of poverty. Thus, the tax and transfer system can be used as a measure to ameliorate the situation in the rural areas.
Finally, we discuss the links between household gross incomes and taxes paid or subsidies received. The results obtained here shed light on the possibility of making inference on the marginal impact of the tax and transfer systems respectively. As observed in figures 6 and 7a, both the average and marginal rates of taxes and subsidies increase with income, and are thus progressive. Furthermore, the marginal taxation rate net of benefits is also an increasing function of income and is equally progressive (see Figure 7a ).
This is an indication that on average the rate of taxes is low (high) for low (high) income earners while subsidy rates are high (low) for low (high) income earners.. Though the marginal rate of net tax is close to that of the tax, the net tax system is more progressive as expressed in figure 7b . Finally, both taxes and benefits vary strongly with income as shown in figure 8 . The government could effectively target the poor by raising taxes for financing in the education and health sectors.
Conclusions and recommendations
This study intended to examine the progressivity of taxes and social services (i.e.
education and health), and to assess the overall system. The results are presented in tables B-2 to B-5 and on figures 1 to 8.
On the tax side, results suggest strong and progressive indirect taxes including the VAT, excises, import duties, petroleum and its related taxes. Policy makers should be assured that shifting the tax structure towards excises VAT and gasoline taxes rather than import duties would be equitable. It is important to remember that progressivity is not the only quality of a good tax. Other qualities such as a tax's impact on economic efficiency (distortions in the allocation of resources), its cost of collection, and administration do matter.
Nevertheless, progressivity or equity matters for a country that takes the welfare of its poor to heart. For direct taxes, personal income tax shows slight progressivity based on estimations from the old system whereas family business tax is progressive. However, with the 2004 tax reform on personal income taxes, the structure could become progressive following the unique progressive rates now applicable. Tax burden weighs more on urban residents, followed by rural and semi-urban population and the net tax system is found to reduce inequality.
For social services, analyses of health services indicate that most are progressive in the sense that they are distributed more equally than income, though hospital care appears less progressive than primary health facilities, which slightly meets the criterion of per capita progressivity. For education, the poorest deciles benefit most from the primary schooling subsidy which is per capita progressive, and benefits least from secondary and tertiary spending. The opposite pattern applies to the richest deciles. Analysis of overall benefit incidence of spending on education and health reveals a slight balance in terms of progressivity of social services over milieu of residence to the advantage of the rural areas as opposed to semi-urban and urban areas respectively.
When we consider the two sets of policies together, they are found to be more progressive and poverty-reducing when we use relative poverty lines in rural areas, followed by semi-urban and urban areas, respectively. Though we also realized a poverty-increasing effect of the net tax system using absolute poverty lines, the poverty impact still remains minimal in the rural areas where poverty is high (and where inequality actually increased between 1996 and 2001) than in urban areas.This lends support to the fact that governments could raise much revenue from taxes to finance the construction of schools and hospitals in poor neighborhoods without any regressive tendencies. Overall, the current government policy can help, however, by making sure that the tax burdens of the poor are nil or very low and that the composition and direction of public expenditures on education and health favor the poor. Finally, the interpretation of such results should always be done with caution following the numerous assumptions made and diverse data sources used in reaching the results.
Appendix A
A.1 Models of Tax Incidence
The basic methodology behind conventional models of tax incidence is to allocate tax burdens to different income groups, ordered from rich to poor by deciles or quintiles of the population. A tax normally transfers real purchasing power from households to the government. Generally, there can be large differences between who the law says is obligated to pay taxes and who ultimately in the economy bears the burden of taxes or whose real purchasing power falls in the course of government imposition. For instance, governments in developing countries collect most taxes from firms, but the firms do not suffer reductions in their purchasing power. Either the households that own them do, or the firm shifts the tax to its customers through changes in its prices especially in cases where the firm is highly competitive or has an inelastic demand for its products. On the other hand, a tax on firms' profits probably falls mostly on firms' owners.
Thus, tax incidence studies determine economic rather than statutory incidence (which refers to those taxpayers that are by law required to pay the tax). In this light, tax incidence studies often adopt a number of assumptions, which permit the shifting process of tax burdens from the legal payer to the person whose real purchasing power is finally affected. To arrive at an estimate of the incidence for the entire tax system, effective calculation of average tax rates by level of expenditure or income is done separately for each income group. In the simplest of cases, where taxes are collected according to the letter of the law, this calculation is straightforward for ad valorem taxes. The tax paid is just the tax rate times the pre-tax value of expenditures given as:
where T ij is household i's total loss in purchasing power for a tax on good j; p j x ij is household i's pre-tax amount of expenditure on good j; t j is the ad valorem tax rate; and exp ij is the post-tax amount of expenditure on good j. The fact that T ij is proportional to exp ij , the expenditure that is reported in a household survey, is a convenient assumption. Almost uniformly, markets are assumed to be competitive so that buyers bear the burden of all consumption taxes (see Sahn and Younger, 2004 for a review of other studies). The procedures and application peculiar to Cameroon is provided below. For direct taxes, the factors that produce the incomes pay the associated taxes The direct or income tax in Cameroon has two essential components, the personal income tax and the company tax. The former include taxes on salary and wages, income from non-agricultural enterprises and earnings from securities or financial assets .We adopted the household income tax data on generated by National Statistics Office. Taxes on income from business or non-assumption underlying the estimates is that consumers bear the entire burden according to the share of consumption of the taxed goods and services. Thus, smokers pay taxes on tobacco and households that use kerosene as fuel or for lamps pay the taxes on kerosene.
For gasoline (petrol and diesel) taxes, no one doubts that the direct consumption of gasoline is highly concentrated among rich households, yet critics of this tax argue that the secondary impact of such a tax is regressive because an increase in the price of gasoline cause increases in other prices such as public transport, on which poor households depend more than rich homes. Therefore, a tax on gasoline falls on direct consumers of gasoline and on users of public transportation services 18 . Import duties are more difficult to capture from a household survey, given that there is no differentiation between imported and domestically produced consumer goods. In this line, the prices of all goods for which imports are a large share of the markets are assumed to go up by the amount of the tariff when it is levied.
Finally, most of the analysis relies on statutory tax rates rather than any estimates of taxes actually paid. Thus, we are aware of the fact that assumptions and measurement differences in tax incidence may occur depending on the environment as well as particular institutional issues such as purchases from the informal sector, smuggling and corruption etc.
Calculation of Household Tax Payments
Indirect taxes on expenditure items
Table A-1 below shows the expenditure items included in the survey data with corresponding taxes that are assumed incurred in purchasing the goods and services. To estimate the tax base for each tax, the following assumptions as provided in the general tax code are made:
• Value added tax (VAT) is levied on the cost in full (c.i.f) 19 value of imports plus import duties paid;
• Import duties and tariffs ( IMD) are levied on the c.i.f value of imports; and
• Commodity specific excises (EXT) on (alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, bottled or mineral water, and jewelleries) are levied on the c.i.f value plus import duty for imported products.
The other indirect tax examined is the special tax on petroleum products (TSSP) such as petrol and diesel (gasoline). The rates are 120 CFA franc for petrol and 65CFA franc for agricultural family enterprises are reported in the survey (question 22, section 11) and are assumed to be very reliable as households tend to report their expenses more accurately than they do for income declaration.
diesel per litre respectively averaging about 22 percent. This rate is applied to each household's consumption of the products. However, the massive removal of implicit taxation on exports of agricultural cash crops has rendered the tax progressive thus favoring the lowincome farmers.
Effective Calculation and Applications
From the assumptions above, we have the following equations:
Where t VAT , t IMD , and t EXT are the respective tax rates. We extend this tax base to consumption expenditure (Cexp) for the calculation of taxes on assumption that prices rise by the full amount of taxes. Thus, Cexp is given as,
Substituting ( In order to examine whether public services target the poor in the redistribution, benefit incidence is used to quantify the incidence on households. Standard benefit incidence is used to determine the average rate of use of health services or attendance in schools. Standard benefit incidence informs us who is benefiting from public services, and describes the welfare impact on different groups of people or individual households of government spending. The unit cost method usually uses the government's cost of provision (obtained usually from government or service-provider data) with information on the use of these services (usually obtained from the households themselves through a sample survey)
to impute or estimate a service's value to users. This imputation is the amount by which household income would have to decrease if it had to pay for the service used. Usually, the total budget spent on the public service is divided by the estimated number of people in the country who use that service. However, the cost measures may not be a good enough approximation of true benefits. Further, unit costs may reflect inefficiencies in public service provision and may not capture possible differences in the quality of services in rich urban areas and in poor rural areas nor take into consideration long-term benefits (for example, basic education or immunization services).
Taking the example of government spending on education (the analysis of spending on health follows the same approach), this can be formally written as:
where B j is the amount of the education subsidy that benefits group j, S and E refer respectively to the government education subsidy and the number of public school enrolments, and the subscript i denotes the level of education (three levels are specified in (5.1) -primary, secondary and tertiary). The benefit incidence of total spending on education imputed to group j is given by the number of primary enrolments from group (E pj ) times the average cost of primary school place, plus the number of secondary enrolments times the secondary average cost, plus the number of tertiary enrolments times the average or unit with e ij defining the share of the group in total enrolments (or service use, i.e. health consultations in the case of health care) at each level of education. The s i is the shares of public spending across the different types of service, which reflects government behavior. In some cases, regional and other (ethnic) variations in subsidies are also taken into account calling for an additional subscript to denote the region specified in the unit cost estimate.
However, there are both theoretical and practical reasons to doubt this practice (van de Walle 1998; Sahn and Younger 1998, 2000) . Given the poor quality of most public expenditure data as well as drawing on budgets at a highly aggregated level, the binary approach proposed by Sahn and Younger (1998, 2000) is used to further and support the analysis
21
. This bypasses the need for estimating the unit subsidy, and focus only on whether a service is used or not with users of public services counted and given the benefit of one, while non-users get zero. In equation (A.3) then, the s i' s are set to unity. Once this is done according to group sample based on per capita expenditure or per adult equivalent, divide each individual's or household's benefits by the total to get his or her share of benefit (i.e. e ij ).
Standard benefit incidence therefore uses group average to estimate the distribution of benefits. Despite its popularity, recent research has pointed out many other limitations (Van de Walle 1998; Lanjouw and Ravallion 1999) . Among the most common criticisms of standard benefit incidence is that the measure does not yield the distributional consequences of a marginal policy change that distributes benefits to existing users in proportion to their benefit. In response to the preceding observation, several recent studies (reviewed by Younger, 2003) have proposed alternative methodology known as the "behavioral" approach used in benefit incidence which consists of a variety of methods for analysing the marginal benefit incidence of policy changes. This method further allows the estimation of incidence for public spending for which specific users cannot be identified and incorporates individual behavioral responses thereby providing concrete guidance for policy reform. Another advantage that this method provides is the possibility to estimate, econometrically, compensating and equivalent variations or the willingness to pay for price and other policy change. Similarly, demand functions for health care and education have been determined by a host of other studies
22
. Younger (2003) noted that despite the fact that all the methods claim to measure "marginal" incidence, they do not measure the same thing nor are they intended to do so. Further arguing, he says there are many possible policy changes and thus many margins of interest and each method captures one of these and so is of interest for some analyses and inappropriate for others.
The problems with these approaches are that the comparability of results is quite limited since the prices (i.e. fees and other private expenses incurred) used, generally imputed from costs of travel, queuing, etc., are high and may seldom be met in reality, or that either the services are free or money prices are difficult to measure accurately.
Furthermore, the willingness to pay for services as expressed by the head of the household may have little to do with the private benefits children receive from education or health care and lastly the model also suffers a series of econometric problems in the case where the non exogeneity of policy measures renders the coefficients of the model biased etc. Finally, though standard benefit incidence has loopholes, the behavioral approach also has its own demerits. According to Younger (1999) , for policymakers who are primarily interested in ranking the progressivity of benefits associated with various categories of public expenditure, or whether a service is progressive, available evidence indicates that little value is added in going beyond the simplest approach that assesses who makes use of what service. In that sense the standard method is supported as long as it is interpreted correctly. In particular, expanded access to services, rather than changes in fees, is often what policymakers have in mind when considering increased spending on a public service.
22 Paul Gertler and his associates considered as pioneers in this area have applied these techniques to the demand for health and education in developing countries (Gertler at al., 1987, Gertler and Glewwe 1990) . a-Gasoline via transport refers to the part of the direct tax on gasoline that falls on users of public transport. b-Transport and gasoline refers to the combined impact of the direct tax on gasoline and the indirect tax on users of public transport. c-Gasoline refers to the direct tax on gasoline. Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviation Source: Author's calculation based on household survey data and data provided by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
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